Education, unemployment and migration by Wolfgang Eggert et al.
 
    
 




























Center for International Economics 
University of Paderborn  
Warburger Strasse 100 





Education, unemployment and migration 
 
Wolfgang Eggert, Tim Krieger  
and Volker Meier 
 
Revised Version, August 2009 
 
 







Ifo Institute for Economic Research,
University of Munich, and CESifo
20th August 2009
Abstract
This paper studies a two-region model in which unemployment, educa-
tion decisions and interregional migration are endogenous. The poorer
region exhibits both lower wages and higher unemployment rates, and
migrants to the richer region are disproportionally skilled. The brain
drain from the poor to the rich region is accompanied by stronger in-
centives to acquire skills even for immobile workers. Regional shocks
tend to aﬀect both regions in a symmetric fashion, and skilled-biased
technological change reduces wages of the unskilled. Both education
and migration decisions are distorted by a uniform unemployment com-
pensation, which justiﬁes a corrective subsidization.
JEL classiﬁcation: H23; I20; J61; J64; R10.
Keywords: Brain drain; Brain gain; Education; Unemployment; In-
terregional migration; Externalities.
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This paper deals with skill formation in a context with endogenous migra-
tion and an imperfect labor market, thereby providing new insights into
the interaction of education, migration and unemployment in an interre-
gional context. We explore the mechanisms creating a brain drain out of a
poor sending region and identify channels of how those left behind in the
poorregion may experiencea counteracting brain gain via higher propensit-
ies to acquire human capital induced by the equilibrium e¤ects on wages.
Moreover, we indicate how regional and national economic shocks a¤ect
educational decisions and interregional migration. Given that education
and migration subsidies are frequently used as active labor market policies
in many countries, we also aim at rationalizing the di¤erent policies from a
welfare perspective. Our discussion of the relevant externalities casts some
doubt on the e¢ciency of these policies. We argue that while subsidies for
both education and migration may bejusti…ed in general, subsidies at a rate
of one hundred per cent seem doubtful.
It is frequently observed that substantial interregional wage di¤erentials
within a country exist, where the low-wage regions are also characterized
by comparatively high unemployment rates. For example, in Germany unit
labor costs in manufacturing in the East were at 65 per cent of the national
average in 2004, while the unemployment rate in East Germany of around
20 per cent exceeded the national unemployment rate by more than 8 per-
centage points (Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft, 2006). In the same year,
unemployment in Southern Italy stood at around 14.5 percent, exceeding
the national average by 6.5 percentage points, despite low labor costs ofless
than 85 per cent of the national average in manufacturing. A third example
is Southern Spain, with an unemployment rate of 16 per cent in 2004, …ve
percentage points higher than the national average. Again, this region of
high unemployment displays relatively low labor costs of less than 90 per
cent of the Spanish average in manufacturing (Eurostat, 2007). In an inter-
national context, the average unemployment rate in the 10 poorest OECD
countries in 2003 was 7.3%, while in the ten richest OECD economies it
was only 4.2% (OECD 2009). In all these cases, similar relations hold for
longer time spans, often without clear tendencies of convergence. It has to
be noted, however, that international migration is often restricted by the
rich countries.
Further, high-wage regions tend to have a higher share of high-skilled
1individuals in their workforce. Due to a high demand for quali…ed workers,
they o¤er attractive jobs to natives and foreigners alike, the latter indu-
cing a brain drain out of poorer regions. The recent literature and data
on the brain drain (Carrington and Detragache, 1998; Beine et al., 2008;
and Docquier et al., 2009) con…rms these features. When comparing the
10 richest and poorest OECD countries in terms of GDP per capita in the
year 2000, we observe that in the bottom-10 (top-10) countries 13% (47%)
of the labor force have tertiary education; that the emigration rate of in-
dividuals with tertiary education is 13% (11%); and that of the stock of
immigrants 21% (48%) are high-skilled.1 As expected from theoretical ana-
lyses, the propensity to migrate is stronger for high-skilled individuals than
for the low-skilled (Sjaastad, 1962; Borjas, 2000; Wildasin, 2000). Finally,
a higher formal quali…cation is always associated with a reduced unemploy-
ment risk in the data, con…rming the prediction of theory (e.g. McKenna,
1996; Becker, 1993; Lindbeck and Snower, 1988).
Our model captures all these stylized facts. We consider two regions in
which workers take decisions on acquiring skills and migration to the other
region. Migration will arise in only one direction, from the poor to the rich
region. It is a mechanism that reduces the interregional wage and unem-
ployment di¤erentials, albeit not in a perfect fashion. There is a persistent
technological gap between the regions that is not explained. By contrast,
the higher mobility of skilled workers is an endogenous result. Unemploy-
ment arises according to an e¢ciency wage argument of the shirking type.
While the shirking model allows for a particularly simple analysis of the
issues involved, it should be noted that the main messages of our study will
also turn out with alternative explanations of unemployment.
Our …rst main result shows that, though starting from a symmetric skill
distribution across regions, the share of skilled workers among the emig-
rants exceeds thecorresponding shareamong those left behind. Thedriving
force behind this result is a higher skill premium in the rich region, al-
lowing for higher migration costs to make relocation of skilled workers still
worthwhile.2 Moreover, we extend therecent brain drain literature by intro-
ducing a new channel for a brain gain of the poor region, working through
1Own calculations based on Docquier et al. (2009) and OECD (2009).
2A similar strati…ed outcome is derived in Anderberg and Andersson (2007), who con-
sider educational decisions of young individuals when skilled jobs are rationed and match-
ing frictions induce permanent residential segregation. This in turn generates a lower
expected return to skill acquisition for individuals from adverse social environments, mak-
ing them less likely to invest in education.
2an equilibrium e¤ect on wages. Since the skill premium rises with a smaller
aggregate labor supply due to outmigration, medium ability workers now
acquire skills. This a¤ects even those workers who never plan to migrate
due to high migration costs. This distinguishes our …nding from the previ-
ous literature which stresses stronger incentives to invest in education upon
expecting some positive probability of emigration (Mountford, 1997; Stark
et al., 1997, 1998; Vidal, 1998; Beine et al., 2001). Although the emigrants
are disproportionally skilled, the share of skilled workers among those stay-
ing in the poor region may increase, implying a brain gain. The traditional
brain drain literaturediscusses some elements of this story in models with a
traditional and a modern sector (Bhagwati and Hamada, 1974; McCulloch
and Yellen, 1975; Rodriguez, 1975), but remains more pessimistic.
Improving educational attainment by training programs and promoting
migration to more prosperous regionsare frequently used policy instruments
to reduce unemployment. Our second main result is related to the question
whether such labor market policies can be justi…ed on e¢ciency grounds.
From an allocative perspective, the presence of unemployment tends to dis-
tort the decisions of individuals. It may induce overinvestment (Kodde,
1988; Charlot et al., 2005; Albrecht and Vroman, 2002) or underinvestment
(Dellas, 1997; Laing et al., 1995; Acemoglu, 1996; Cahuc and Michel, 1996;
Cubitt and Hargreaves Heap, 1999) in education, where similar arguments
can be made for migration. In our model, due to the unemployment rate
di¤erential across skill groups within a region and across regions for a given
skill group, the incentives to acquire human capital and to migrate to the
rich region both tend to be too strong, as measured by the productivity
di¤erentials of employed workers. This view suggests to tax rather than to
subsidize education and migration. However, we argue that the di¤erentials
in unemployment levelsneedalso betaken into account by asocial plannerin
any second-best allocation. Only changes of unemployment rates represent
externalities of education and migration decisions. By contrast, unemploy-
ment bene…ts will reduce the incentiveto become a skilled worker and lower
interregional mobility. Correcting for the latter distortions may require an
education subsidy and some mobility premium. If we neglect the presum-
ably small general equilibrium externalities in our model, it turns out that
education or migration subsidization should not be given at a 100% rate for
marginal individuals. This result holds because each type of human capital
investment decision always needs to be associated with a gain in expected
wage income. Clearly, this observation casts some doubt on active labor
3market policies pursued in many countries.3
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. After introducing
the model in Section 2, the following Section 3 characterizes equilibria and
investigates issues of stability and the interaction of wages. Section 4 com-
prises some comparative statics. Section 5 is concerned with a welfare ana-
lysis of the equilibria and discusses policies to overcome the resulting inef-
…ciencies. Finally, Section 6 concludes and indicates directions for future
research.
2 The model
Basic assumptions We consider two regions i 2 fA;Bg. The mass of
individuals born in region i is denoted by ni. Individuals are characterized
by their place of birth, their cost of acquiring human capital c 2 (0;1)
and their cost of migration d 2 (0;1) to the other region. The education
and migration costs are to be interpreted as equivalent to a utility loss of
that size per unit of time. The density function '(c;d) that describes the
distribution ofcosts is thesame in both regions and has support on (0;1)
2:
Let c, d bestatistically independent. Wedenoteby f(c) thedensity function
and by F(c) =
Rc
0 f(x)dx the cumulative distribution function with respect
to the human capital acquisition cost c for any given migration cost d.
We analyze a framework in which individuals recognize that migration
and educationdecisionsareinterdependent. Intheinitial stageat datet =0
individuals choose their skill level between h (high) and l (low) and their
residence region. Education may take place in either region, and skills are
perfectly transferable across regions. In the subsequent production stage,
running from datet = 0to in…nity, jobsarerandomly allocated amongall in-
dividuals supplying labor ofa speci…ctypeon regional labor markets. Firms
producea homogeneousnumerairegood from laborand set thewageinorder
to give employed individuals an incentive not to shirk. The numeraire good
is traded on a competitive market across regions. Individuals have perfect
foresight with respect to second stage wages and unemployment rates when
3Our sceptical view on active labor market policies and education programs bears some
relation to Saint-Paul (1994, 1996). He points out that when skill-speci…c wages depend
on the respective unemployment rates, an increase in the relative supply of skilled workers
will not only increase total output, but also the skill-speci…c unemployment rates. As the
share ofindividuals with the lower unemployment rate increases, aggregate unemployment
may move in either direction. Hence, education policy has a negative general equilibrium
e¤ect that may more than o¤set the immediate gain in reducing unemployment.
4they make their decisions in the …rst stage. In the following we characterize
individual choices in the …rst stage and then describe production decisions.
Let pk
i be the unemployment probability of an individual of skill type k
living inregioni inany period. Supposethat theunemployedin eitherregion
regardless of their skill type receive a uniform unemployment bene…t b. As
we do not want to stress distortions arising from taxation of labor, let the
bene…t be …nanced by a lump-sum tax on residual income. The latter is
assumed to always exceed aggregate claims of the unemployed. The value






where preferences u satisfy the properties u(0) = 0; u0 > 0, u00 · 0. The
wagefor skill typek in region i is denoted by wk
i. Without loss ofgenerality,
we assume that region A is the high-wageregion. The required e¤ort at the
workplace e >0 is identical for all jobs.
Individuals’ migration and education decisions In the …rst stage, a
pair ofcosts(c; d) and theplaceofbirth determineschoices. An individual of
typek will stay inherbirth regioni ifvk
j · vk
i. Clearly, all individualswithin
the group of non-migrants are indi¤erent to invest in education whenever
vl
i =vh
i ¡^ ci: (2)
This means that individuals in the group of non-migrants with higher costs
than the cuto¤ level ^ ci choose not to invest in education.
Let us next characterize the decisions of migrants. They are all born
in B; consider …rst the case where c < ^ cB. These low education cost types
will acquire skills and are indi¤erent whether to stay in region B or move
to region A when
vh
B =vh
A ¡ ^ dh: (3)
For any threshold ^ dh > 0, the high-wage region A is the place of residence
fora set ofindividualsborn in B with costs d< ^ dh. Considernext education
cost types born in region B with ^ cB < c < ^ cA. These individuals clearly
will not invest in education in region B, but they may obtain skill after
migration anticipating the high wage in region A. Speci…cally, individuals
born in region B areindi¤erent between migration with education versus no
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Figure 1: Migration and education thresholds of individuals born in re-
gion B.
of the two cuto¤ values
c +d = ^ dh +^ cB = ^ dl +^ cA; (4)
where ^ dl =vl
A ¡vl
B is the cuto¤ level of migration costs for low-skilled indi-
viduals. The second equality can easily be veri…ed by using the de…nitions
of the threshold values. Lemma 1 collects the results on the choices of the
individuals.
Lemma 1 A combination (c;d) and the place of birth characterizes indi-




i) Individuals born in region A choose:
i.a) c <^ cA: education;
i.b) c >^ cA: no education.
ii) Individuals born in region B choose:
ii.a) d > ^ dh ^ c <^ cB: education without migration (nh
B);
ii.b) d+c < ^ dh+^ cB^d< ^ dh^c < ^ cA: education withmigration (mh
B);
ii.c) d+c > ^ dh+^ cB^d> ^ dl, c >^ cB: nomigration, no education (nl
B);
ii.d) d < ^ dl, c > ^ cA: migration without education (ml
B).
6Population structure Figure 1 compiles the structure of decisions in
region B. Individuals with characteristics associated with …eld nh
B acquire
skills and stay in region B due to high costs of migration. Individuals with
high costsofeducation and low costs of migration will migrateas low-skilled
toregion A (massml
B). Thechoicebetweenstaying aslow-skilledin B (mass
nl
B) or becoming high-skilled in region A (mh
B) is governed by the sum of
the costs c and d as discussed in Lemma 1 in ii:b and ii:c. The diagonal in
Figure 1 has a slope of ¡1 between …eld nl
B to the right and mh
B because
education and migration costs cause an equivalent utility loss per unit of
time. Furthermore, Lemma 1 in ii:b and ii:c implies that the diagonal in






. Hence, it is impossible
to change one of the four threshold values independent of the three other
ones. Denote by nk
A the mass of individuals of type k located in region A.
To obtain nk
A add the migrants from the other region mk
B and the number
of natives in region A of type k.
Some general results are summarized in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 (i) The share of individuals acquiring skills in region B is
smaller than in region A. (ii) The share of skilled workers among the mi-
grants to region A exceeds the share of skilled workers remaining in region
B. (iii) The share of skilled workers among those staying in region B is
smaller than the corresponding share among the natives in region A. (iv) In
a migration equilibrium, the share of skilled workers in region A is higher
than the corresponding share in region B. (v) In a migration equilibrium, the
share of skilled workers among the immigrants exceeds the share of skilled
workers among the natives in region A:
Proof. See Appendix A.
The incentive to acquire skills is stronger in the rich region due to a
higher absolute expected wage premium. The larger weighted wage di¤er-
ential is also relevant for the migrants to the rich region and corresponds
with a stronger migration incentive for skilled workers. Therefore, a smaller
share of individuals born in the poor region becomeskilled workers, and the
share of skilled workers among those left behind falls short of the share of
skilled workers among the migrants to the rich region. The migrants repres-
ent a positiveselection in terms ofquali…cation from theoriginal population
of the poor region. Taking this selection e¤ect together with the result that
the share of educated workers among the natives of region A exceeds the
7corresponding share of those being born in region B explains why this re-
lation also holds in any migration equilibrium. Moreover, the selectivity
of migrants more than o¤sets the smaller incentive to acquire skills in the
sending region, resulting in a higher “quality” (Borjas, 1985) of immigrants
compared to the natives in the receiving region. In our framework, the wel-
fare state tends to discourage particularly migration of low-skilled workers,
which adds to themarket-based pattern of stronger migration incentives for
the high-skilled.
Note that contrary to most of the literature we endogenously derive the
higher propensity to migrate of skilled workers. Further, the di¤erences in
the expected wage premia also arise endogenously. The mere existence of
skilled migrants in the sorting equilibrium implies that the skill premium
in the rich region must be higher than in the poor region, and that the
migration premium of skilled workers must exceed the migration premium
of unskilled workers. Otherwise, some marginal types would …nd it more
pro…table either to become skilled worker in the poor region or to migrate
as an unskilled worker.
At given education and migration thresholds it can be argued that the
poor region su¤ers from a brain drain, marked by the higher average skill
level of the emigrants. Moreover, with a …xed education threshold ^ cB, the
share of unskilled workers in the poor region is higher in the migration
equilibrium than in the absence of migration. However, migration from the
poorto therich region makeslabor scarcerin thepoorregion. Consequently,
wagesandtheexpected absolutewagepremiumofskilled workersin thepoor
region will be driven upwards. As this yields a higher education threshold,
the brain drain will be associated with a brain gain. Conversely, migration
tends to bring wages and the skill premium in the rich region down, which
in turn reduces the incentive to migrate.
An example in which the share of skilled workers in the poor region
increases after moving from a closed border to a free migration regime can
be constructed as follows. Suppose there are three groups of workers in
region B with population shares ni characterized by migration costs c1 <
c2 <c3 and migration costs d1 <d2 · d3. Individuals of the high-cost type
3 never become skilled and always stay in the poor region. By contrast,
individualsofthelow-typecost groupalways becomeskilled and will migrate
ifmigrationis allowed. Finally, themedium type2individualsnevermigrate
and acquireskills only ifforeseeing emigration of type1 individualsresulting
in a higher skill premium in region B: The brain gain result is obtained if
8the population shares satisfy n1=(n1 +n2 +n3) <n2=(n2 +n3).
This channel of a brain gain has previously been neglected in the lit-
erature. The standard argument of a brain gain states that the expected
skill premium rises with the possibility of emigration when people expect to
migrate with some positive probability. Whilethis line of reasoning remains
true, even those who know beforehand that they will remain in the poor
region tend to have a higher incentive to become skilled due to general equi-
librium e¤ects a¤ecting the structure of wages. These e¤ects may even be
more pronounced when skilled labor and unskilled labor are complements,
as the brain drain then further increases the skill premium.
Production and unemployment Let Lh
i and Ll
i denote total employ-
ment of high-skilled and low-skilled labor in region i, respectively. While
Proposition 1 also holds for more general technologies, we con…neouratten-
tion in the following to the case in which the two types of labor are perfect





with ¯A > ¯B > 0, where G is a strictly concave function with decreasing
returns, and one unit ofskilled labor is equivalent to ¾> 1 unitsofunskilled
labor.
We consider the standard shirking model of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984)
to motivate the existence of unemployment. Individuals are in…nitely lived
and choose whether or not to shirk. Let us denote by r the discount rate,
s is the exogenous separation rate, and a is the job acquisition rate. The
probability that a shirker is caught and …red immediately is q. The asset
equations of employed shirkers (denoted by superscript S), employed non-

























. Rearranging terms and using the ‡ow equilib-
rium condition apk
i = s(1 ¡ pk












9Cost minimization of the …rm implies that the no-shirking condition (8)
holds with strict equality. This allows us to establish an inverse relationship














Inspection of (5) and (6) shows that an employed worker earns the informa-
tion rent WkE
i ¡WkU
i =e=q. Laborof type k is employed until the marginal








Skilled workers have a higher marginal productivity than unskilled work-
ers at any given combination of employment of both skill groups, i.e.,
@Gi=@Lh
i > @Gi=@Ll
i. This implies that the unemployment rate of skilled
workers always falls short of the unemployment rate of unskilled workers.
3 Equilibria, stability, and wage e¤ects
The assumption of perfect substitutability of skilled and unskilled labor
drives some results as a higher labor supply through education or migra-
tion tends to reduce all wages and to increase all unemployment rates in
the respective region, and vice versa. These general equilibrium externalit-




i denote total labor supply of high-skilled and low-
skilled workers in region i in a post-migration situation. The no-shirking
condition (8) holds for each skill type and region. Due to this condition,
wl
i, the wage rate of low-skilled workers in region i, determines ph
i and pl
i,
the unemployment rates of skilled and unskilled workers in region i. Con-
sequently, the threshold values are functions of the wage for the low-skilled











B): It then turns out that the model boils down to a system
of two equilibrium conditions f1(wl
A;wl
B) =0 and f2(wl
A; wl























B. Recall that nidepictsinitial populationsizein
region i: Further, Lemma 1 together with theaccounting equation ^ dh+^ cB =
^ dl+^ cA imply that nh
A and nl
A are determined by threethreshold values. Spe-
ci…cally, we can write nh
A = nh
A(nA; nB; ^ cA; ^ dh; ^ dl), nl
A = nl
A(nA;nB;^ cA; ^ dl)
in (11) and nh
B = nh
B(nB; ^ cB; ^ dh), nl
B = nl
B(nB; ^ cB; ^ dh; ^ dl) in (12). The

















with h1(0) = h2(0) = 0; h0
1 > 0 and h0
2 > 0. Thus, the wage in a region

































0 hold at the equilibrium point. We replace the former condition by the








· 0, and assume that all three
conditions hold with strict inequality.



































Hence, considering a perturbation of the migration equilibrium, the in-
crease of the marginal product of labor upon a rising wage will fall short
of the wage increase after adaptation of skill-speci…c unemployment rates,
education and migration decisions. Moreover, the product of cross e¤ects of
wage increases on the resulting marginal productivity of labor in the other
region has to be comparatively small.













































































A=@ ^ dh > 0, @nh
A=@ ^ dl > 0, @nl
A=@ ^ dl > 0, @nh
B=@ ^ dh <
0; @nl
B=@ ^ dh < 0 and @nl
B=@ ^ dl < 0 hold from Lemma 1, as can also be
veri…edby inspecting Figure1. Itisstraightforwardto seethat themigration
thresholds decrease with a smaller wage di¤erential. Thus, @ ^ dk=@wl
A > 0
and @ ^ dk=@wl
B < 0 for k 2 fh; lg.
The impact ofa higher wage in therich region A on the wagein thepoor
region B is unambiguously positive. The rising interregional wage di¤eren-
tials increase the migration incentives for both high-skilled and low-skilled
workers. In addition, some individuals will choose to become educated and
to migrate as high-skilled workers rather than staying as low-skilled workers
in the poor region. This reduces the supply of both types of workers in the
poor region.
The impacts of a higher wage in the poor region B on the wage in the
rich region A are analogous. A decreasing interregional wage di¤erential
reduces migration of low-skilled and high-skilled workers to the rich region.
Consequently, aggregate labor supply in the rich region declines, inducing a
higher wage.
For thecomparative staticanalysis, we takethe natural assumption that
the threshold education costs are increasing monotonously in the respective
wage levels, that is, when determining education decisions, the increasing
skill premium upon a rising wage always dominates the possibly shrinking
unemployment di¤erential.
4 Comparative statics
Proposition 2 collects the results of changing parameters on the migration
equilibrium.
12Proposition 2 A higher initial population in the rich or the poor region,
nA or nB, will induce (i) lower wages, (ii) higher skill-speci…c unemployment
rates, and (iii) smaller education cost thresholds in both regions. A rising
productivity factor in the richor the poorregion, ¯A or ¯B, yields an increase
of the wage rate and smaller group unemployment rate in both regions. A
rising productivity factor of skilled workers ¾ will decrease the wage of low-
skilled workers in both regions and increase their regional unemployment
rates.
Proof. See Appendix B.
A populationincreasein one region may best beinterpreted as migration
from abroad that isregionally concentrated. Such a concentration can occur
due to the possible existence of networks for migrants in only one region.
At given education and migration thresholdsand …xed unemployment rates,
an increasing population in the rich region A raises employment of workers
of both types in this region, thereby reducing the wage rate wl
A: The falling
wage reduces the migration thresholds in region B, contributing to a rising
labor supply and a falling wage in region B. Thus, all threshold costs fall,
which is depicted by a move from the initial situation with solid lines in
Figure 2 to the new equilibrium marked by dotted lines. Since the no-
shirking condition dictates that wage cuts are always associated with more
unemployment, all skill-speci…c unemployment rates rise.
A rising population in the poor region B at given migration thresholds
directly increases employment of both types of labor in both regions, im-
plying a falling wage in both regions. The cross e¤ects of wages on each
other are always positive, reinforcing the downward pressure. This in turn
increases the skill-speci…c unemployment rates and reduces the education
thresholds.
A higher productivity of workers in the rich region directly increases
the wage there. This wage increase yields stronger migration incentives in
the poor region, leading to an out‡ow of workers of both types. Due to
the reduction in labor supply, the wage rate in the poor region will also go
up. Hence, workers in the poor region will be a¤ected by a technological
shock occuring in the high-wage region in the same direction. In sum, both
migration thresholds and botheducation thresholdsrise, as shown in the left
panel of Figure 3. If the productivity of labor in the poor region increases,
for example due to a successful imitation, there is a direct positive e¤ect
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Figure 3: E¤ects of a variation in ¯A and ¯B on migration and education
thresholds.
14incentive to the high-wage region, which contributes to rising wages across
the board. This is illustrated in the right panel of Figure 3, where both
education thresholds rise and both migration thresholds decline.
If the productivity of high-skilled workers increases, which can be in-
terpreted as skill-biased technological change, this yields more employment
in both regions at given decision thresholds, leading to a lower wage for
the low-skilled. The increasing wage di¤erential between workers of di¤er-
ent skill types implies rising propensities to acquire skills in both regions.
Again, this tends to increase employment of labor in e¢ciency units and
to decrease wages. All these e¤ects are reinforced by the positive interde-
pendence of wages across regions. The regional unemployment rates of the
low-skilled rise because the motive to replace low-skilled workers by high-
skilled workers to avoid shirking is strengthened.
5 Welfare analysis and policy implications
Taking as given that the ‡at unemployment bene…t b exists, it may be
asked whether the individuals’ economic decisions in combination yield an
e¢cient allocation. In the following, the marginal utility of consumption is
set constant to keep the analysis as simple as possible. The unemployment
rates that occur due to avoid shirking do not re‡ect a market failure. The


















net of costs of e¤ort, education and migration, subject to the no-shirking
constraints (8) and wage determination by the marginal productivity rule
(10). The no-shirking constraints can be read to explain the group unem-
























> 0. From a social point of
view, education should be purchased if the cost of acquiring human capital
is justi…ed by the weighted gain in utility, corrected for general equilibrium
externalities. An analogous consideration holds for migration decisions.
Changes in regional aggregate labor supply create general equilibrium
externalities. The migrant ignores the positive e¤ects of lower aggregate
labor supply on unemployment in the region of origin and the negative
15e¤ect of increased aggregate labor supply on unemployment at destination.
By contrast, the change in the wage levels is an example of a pecuniary
externality which does not constitute a market failure.
Migration of a worker of type k ²fh;lg from region B to region A yields











































Thesign of ¡k hinges on two counteracting e¤ects. While the reaction ofthe
unemployment rate to an increase in labor supply tends to be larger in the
poorer region, the expected loss in utility from an additional unemployed
is higher in the rich region. Migration reduces skill-speci…c unemployment
rates in the sending region and increases these group unemployment rates
in the receiving region.
Considering education in region i, the general equilibrium externality in





































When a worker acquires skills, aggregate labor supply in e¢ciency units in
theregion increases. At given group unemployment rates, total employment
increases, depressing the marginal product of labor. Due to the no-shirking
conditions the resulting falling wages will be accompanied by higher group
unemployment rates.


















Similarly, the social planner will choose to qualify those workers being
















¡c +¡A >0 (22)




































holds. Comparing theconditions(21)-(23) to theindividuals’ criteriareveals
that the unemployment bene…t is a second source of distortion. As the
probability of receiving this bene…t is higher for low-skilled workers, the
number of workers who acquire skills is too small. As with given skills the
share of unemployed is higher in the poor region, the number of migrants
is also too small from a social point of view. This consideration is slightly
modi…ed by the general equilibrium externalities.
Proposition 3 A corrective region-speci…c education subsidy ¾i that














u(b) + ¡i. The level of the respective subsidy always falls
short of the full education or migration cost of the marginal individual.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Neglecting the presumably small general equilibrium externalities, Pro-
position 3 can be interpreted as follows. The higher the unemployment
di¤erential across skill groups or regions is, the higher the optimal subsidy
will be. As a reduction in the overall unemployment rate will typically de-
crease these di¤erentials, we may also expect that such subsidies tend to be
higher in countries with a higher national unemployment rate.
The second part of Proposition 3 shows that the marginal individual
will always have to bear part of the investment or migration cost. This
is of course a natural consequence of the fact that each type of human
capital investment decision isalwaysassociatedwith a gainin expectedwage
income. However, it also indicates that it generally does not make sense to
subsidize education and migration at a rateof 100% forthe individuals with
17thehighest cost level. Otherwise, wewould end up with only skilled workers,
who all choose to live in the rich region A:
This observation casts some doubts on active labor market policies pur-
sued in several countries. It is not unusual that education and training pro-
grams for the unemployed are sponsored by national employment agencies
at a rateof100%. When reinterpreting ourdistributionofeducation costsas
distribution of success probabilities, we should expect that too many people
participate in highly subsidized education and training programs. Thus, it
is not astonishing that evaluation studies often …nd zero or small impacts
of such programs on subsequent employment probabilities and earnings of
the participants (see, e.g., Heckman et al., 1999; Bergemann et al., 2004;
Lechner et al., 2005; Albrecht et al., 2005).
Under a perfect information scenario, it is always possible to achieve a
Pareto improvement on the resulting allocation without subsidies. This is
obviously truebecausetotal output net ofall costsincreases. ThePareto im-
provement would beimplemented by taxing residual incomeand distributing
theproceeds as type-speci…ctransfers to workers. Neglecting the changes in
residual income, all workers in the rich region lose by moving to an alloca-
tion with e¢cient investment levels. The necessary transfers to ensure the
status quo level of expected utility will be highest for the marginal types
who still invest in education or migration. It cannot be excluded that neg-
ative minimum transfers arise for individuals in the poor region who do not
change their education decision.
By contrast, ifthegovernment cannot observethetypeof theindividual,
it will generally no longer bepossibleto implement a self-…nancing mechan-
ism that induces all individuals to takethee¢cient investment decisions and
makes everybody better o¤ (seeKolmar and Meier, 2005, for a more general
discussion). In this situation, transfers for revealing the type or inducing
particular decisions have to be high enough to ensure a gain in expected
utility for the most unfortunate type. Unlike the perfect information scen-
ario, low-cost types cannot be deterred from taking up these high transfers.
In other words, education and migration subsidies cannot be restricted to
individuals close to the threshold levels. Thus, due to the windfall pro…ts
arising for individuals with a low cost of education or a low cost of migra-
tion, it is generally impossible to design a tax-transfer system that induces
e¢cient decisions and is preferred by everyone to the status quo.
Another possibility to reduce distortions arises when the unemployment
bene…t is considered as an additional policy variable. Againignoring general
18equilibrium externalities, a slight di¤erentiation of unemployment bene…ts
according to type and region in the direction of a constant replacement rate
tends to reduceunderinvestment ineducationandmigration. It may evenbe
possible to fully o¤set the distortions by appropriately speci…ed unemploy-
ment bene…ts. However, recalling that unemployment rates will increase in
the averagelevel of the bene…t, the optimum policy in a framework without
risk aversion clearly is to cut all unemployment bene…ts to zero. In such a
situation, only the general equilibrium externalities are present, which can
be tackled by taxing education and taxing or subsidizing migration.
Applying our analysis to an international brain drain context has some
interesting implications. Given that unemployment bene…tsare typically far
higher in rich destination countries, a social planner aiming at maximizing
world output would tend to tax ratherthan to subsidizeinternational migra-
tion from poor to rich countries. The main justi…cation of such a migration
tax is to reduce overinvestment in migration due to taking unemployment
bene…ts into account. This line of reasoning is clearly totally di¤erent from
the traditional goal of a brain drain tax of compensating those left behind
in the sending countries for their losses by the brain drain. At the same
time, the same social planner would tend to subsidize migration between
rich countries (say, from Germany or France to the US) if the emigration
country pays relatively high unemployment bene…ts.
6 Conclusions
We have developed a framework that mirrors the stylized facts of regional
wage and employment patterns, where the low-wage regions display dis-
proportionally high unemployment rates. The possibility of migration to a
richer region encourages human capital acquisition. As the absolute skill
premium adjusted by the incidence of unemployment and unemployment
bene…ts is higher in richer regions, the interregional adjusted wage di¤er-
entials will be higher for skilled individuals. This yields some brain drain
out of poor regions. The out‡ow of labor then drives the skill premium in
poor regions up and increases incentives for human capital acquisition also
for those who choose not to migrate.
Regional shocks tend to be distributed symmetrically across all regions.
Additional international migration to rich regions will o¤set interregional
migration. Hence, labor supply, wages and unemployment rates tend to dis-
play similar reactions in all regions. Skill-biased technological change tends
19toyieldstrongerincentives forhuman capital accumulation and interregional
migration and will bring down wages of the unskilled.
In a political perspective, apart from presumably small general equi-
librium e¤ects, unemployment yields two distortions on human capital ac-
quisition and migration that work in opposite directions. The skill-speci…c
and interregional unemployment di¤erentials cause too strong incentives,
compared to a full employment situation. These are not relevant for politics
when unemployment isnot associated with externalities. In contrast, unem-
ployment bene…ts can be received with a higher probability when recipients
are unskilled or located in poorer regions. As savings on aggregate unem-
ployment bene…ts are not taken into account by individuals, education and
migration incentives are associated with positive …scal externalities. The
existence of such externalities calls for some subsidization of education and
migration. At thesametime, theextremely high subsidiesin someeducation
and training programs of active labor market policies seem to be exagger-
ated. Westress that these messages remain valid ifalternative explanations
of unemployment are considered, like matching frictions, wage-setting by
unions, statutory minimum wages or insider-outsider relations.
An obvious alternative to the current setup would be a framework with
a stochastic success of education. People would then be di¤erentiated ac-
cording to their success probability instead of their cost of education. Such
a change is not expected to bring about qualitatively di¤erent results, how-
ever. A more serious shortcoming may be seen in the absence of savings
decisions and changes of technology. Imitation and investment in phys-
ical capital may reduce interregional di¤erences in theproductivity of labor,
which would bring down both unemployment rates and interrregional migra-
tion. On the other hand, technological progress will primarily be achieved
in rich regions due to the concentration of skilled labor, which in turn also
attracts investment of physical capital. Hence, while integrating such dy-
namicfactors tends to bring aggregate unemployment down, it is unclear in
advance how they a¤ect the size of interregional di¤erences.
Appendix
A: Proof of Proposition 1
The threshold education cost in region B is equal to ^ cA for d 2 [0; ^ dl], and
lowerthan^ cA forany d > ^ dl. Thisimpliesclaim (i). Thethresholdeducation
20cost in region B equals ^ cB for d ¸ ^ dh, and is higher than ^ cB for any d< ^ dh,
which proves claim (ii). The share ofskilled workers among thestayersin B
is bounded from above by F(^ cB) =
R ^ cB
0 f(c)dc. The share of skilled workers
among thenatives inregion A is F(^ cA). Recalling that ^ cA > ^ cB andf(c) >0
for c 2 [^ cB; ^ cA] then proves claim (iii). Further, (ii) and (iii) imply claim
(iv). Finally, the share of skilled workers among migrants with migration
cost d 2 [0; ^ dl] is F(^ cA), and all migrants with migration cost d > ^ dl are
skilled, which proves claim (v).
B: Proof of Proposition 2







¢ , where ¢njwl
i is
the determinant of the Jacobian of the system (11)-(12), where the column
vector of derivatives with respect to wi has been replaced by the column











































































































































































































Unemployment rates change inversely to the wage rates according to (9).
Further, ci decreases with a falling wage wl
i by assumption.
The column vectors of derivatives of the system of equations (11)-(12)






























Taking into account the assumptions to satisfy the stability conditions,


































































































































Unemployment rates change inversely to the wage rates according to (9).
C: Proof of Proposition 3
Comparing the individuals’ choice criteria to the conditions describing the
socially optimal investment in education and migration immediately shows
that ¾j and ½i exactly o¤set the distortions. The threshold costs in the














































that 0 <¾j <c¤
j and 0 < ½i <di¤.
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